Will Economics Become an Experimental Science? by Plott, Charles R.
DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125 
Will Economics Become an Experimental Science? 
Charles R. Plott 
SOCI AL SCIENCE WORKING PAPER 758 
December 1990 
Will Economics Become an Experimental Science? 
Charles R. Plott 
Abstract 
Economics is becoming a science that is supported by both field research and by labora­
tory experimental research. The paper explores six events that form the foundation for 
the growth of modern laboratory experimental methodology. 
Will Economics Become an Experimental Science? 
Charles R. Plott* 
The expectations of the audience are rational because the answer I will give to the 
question posed by the title of this lecture is exactly what they expect. The answer is 
"yes." No doubt the expectations are also that I will not give a one-word lecture. A 
justification of such a radical answer is expected. Again, the expectations are rational. 
The natural way for me to explain my belief is to focus on the events that have facilitated 
and will continue to facilitate the broad application of laboratory experimental methods. 
Economics has been a non-laboratory science for several hundred years. Many have used 
economics as a classical example of a science in which laboratory methods are impossible. 
What has happened to make experimental methods applicable now and thereby change 
the way in which one can learn about economics? That question is the focus of this 
lecture. 
The sheer growth of papers, researchers, and laboratories suggests that something has 
happened. From the early 1970s the number of papers has grown from two or three per 
year to numbers approximating 100 per year. The number of researchers has grown from 
a small handful in the early 1 970s to hundreds. The number of locations of the research, 
and the number of laboratories have grown from one or two to the range of 30 or 40 . The 
growth is amazing but these are just trends. Such trends do not show the basic logic 
that is at work. The logic, the reasons for the activities, provide the proper support for 
the answer to the question posed in the title. The trends are simply manifestations of 
the logic and events. 
*California Institute of Technology. Presidential address for the annual meeting of the Southern
Economics Association, New Orleans, November 1990. The research support of the National Science 
Foundation and the California Institute of Technology Laboratory for Experimental Economics and 
Political Science is gratefully acknowledged. 
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Six Seductive Steps to Sin and Intoxication 
I think that the foundation for the revolution that we can now see occurring began 
to be developed in the early 1970s. The foundation consists of six events. Collectively 
these events provide the bases for the self-sustaining growth and use of experimental 
methods in both the basic scientific and in the applied scientific aspects of economics. 
Now, to me basic science is fun; so much so that it must be sinful. Experimentation is 
also intoxicating and habituating in the sense that the more one does the more one wants 
to do. Consequently I will refer to the six events that form the foundation for the growth 
of modern experimental methods as the "Six Seductive Steps to Sin and Intoxication." 
Step 1: We Learned How to Pose a Question
Prior to the early 1970s the profession did not pose questions that could be answered 
by the application of experimental methodology. The questions primarily addressed 
aspects of economies as they are found growing wild in nature. Naturally occurring 
economies seem to evolve in response to a wide variety of events and historical accidents. 
The possibility certainly exists that some of such events had nothing at all to do with any 
economic principles that might have been at work. Economies found "in the wild" , so to 
speak, are extremely complicated and the questions posed by the profession had to do 
with the properties of such creatures. Primarily the questions were about measurement 
and about the s tatistical properties of ongoing processes. (What is the elasticity of
demand? vVhat is the relationship between concentration and profits? What is the 
level of employment?) In order to learn about such statistical properties, the economy
in question must be studied directly. The laboratory would seem to have nothing to 
contribute to such effort .  The idea of performing replays of the historical evolution of 
an economy in order to get better observations does not make a lot of sense. Each 
observation would be very costly, to say the least. 
Of course not all questions were about measurement. Many questions were about 
theory but even the theories tended to be directed to explanations about particular 
economies and particular situations in those economics. (What was the contribution of
monetary policy to the great depression? What was the contribution of debt policies 
to the inflation of the 1960s? What were the causes of slums and ghettos in New York 
City? What were the contributions of technological change to the growth of the U.S. 
economy? What was the relationship between structure and performance in specific 
industries?) If the analysis is restricted to only questions of this sort, then only the data .
from these special economies, as they are found naturally evolving during a particular 
period of history, would seem to be relevant. Clearly, in many parts of economics a body 
of general theory had developed, but the focus of the profession was not so much on 
the general behavioral principles of the theory as i t  was on the application of theory to 
specific events. Again, in the absence of a capability to inexpensively replay history, a 
laboratory methodology would appear to have nothing to contribute. 
Laboratory methodology involves a shift from a focus on particular economies as they 
are found in the wild to a focus on general theories, models and principles that govern the 
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behavior of economies. This distinction between the study of an economy and the study 
of models, theories and principles of economics is subtle so an elaboration might prove 
useful. The logic is as follows. General theories must apply to simple special cases. The 
laboratory technology can be used to create simple (but real) economies. These simple 
economies can then be used to test and evaluate the predictive capability of the general 
theories. In this way, a joining of the general theories with data is accomplished. 
Before continuing further, an example of a simple, laboratory economy consisting of 
one market will be given. People are assembled. Some of the people are designated as 
"buyers" and some are designated "sellers." Buyers are involved with the experimenter 
through a contract of the following sort. Buyer i is assigned a "redemption value" func­
tion, Ri(Xi) which indicates the amount of (real) dollars he or she will receive from the
experimenter as a function of Xi, the quantity of the commodity purchased by i. The
buyer i keeps as profits the difference between Ri(Xi) and whatever he or she paid to
sellers for the units. Similarly, the experimenter's contract with seller j is that j will 
pay the experimenter an amount of dollars Ci(Xi) depending on the quantity, Xj, sold
by j. Seller j keeps as (real dollar) profits the difference between the revenue he or she 
received from buyers and the cost paid to the experimenter. 
If the competitive model is applied to the market, then each buyer can be represented 
by a demand function that satisfies the equation 8�1�;) - P = 0. Each seller can be
reprnsented by a supply function that satisfies the equation P - ec;J�i) = 0. That is, the
individual quantity demanded is determined by an equating of price to marginal benefits 
and the individual quantity supplied is determined by an equating of price to marginal 
cost. The market demand is derived by a sum of individual demand functions and the 
market supply is determined by the sum of individual supply functions. The competitive 
model then predicts that the price will be the one that equates market demand with 
market supply. Clearly the law of supply and demand is applied very generally and to 
economies much more complicated than the one just described. It is only natural to 
expect that if it works in very complicated cases then one should expect it to work in 
the simple case. If it does not then a substantial reassessment of the theory would be in 
order. The conclusion of many laboratory experiments is that it does indeed work in the 
simple case. 
Figure 1-A displays the market demand and supply from a simple laboratory market 
conducted at Caltech. Figure 1-B shows the time series of trades that took place in the 
market. The market was organized by a computerized multiple unit double auction. The 
dots represent contract prices displayed in the order in which contracts occurred. The 
vertical lines are the end of market periods or "trading days. " Each trading day was a 
replication of the previous day in the sense that the market demand and supply was the 
same. As can be seen, the time series approaches the prediction of the competitive model. 
Contract prices approach the competitive equilibrium price and volume approaches the 
competitive equilibrium volume as the trading periods are replicated. 
The demand and supply diagram is useful but it does not reflect the potential variety 
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of laboratory applications that is possible. Almost all economic theories and models 
have the same form which elsewhere ( 1979) I have called the "fundamental equation" 
represented in Figure 2. Almost all economic theories and models rest on concepts of 
preferences, technology, (or feasible sets) , and institutions. These concepts form the basic
parameters which are supposed to dictate the behavior of the economy. The fundamental 
equation captures the essence of almost all economics models. Fix the preferences, the 
feasible sets, and the institution (perhaps along with beliefs) and the models will yield
a prediction. It is important to note that it makes no difference where the economy is 
found. The economy could have been found evolving in nature or it could have been a 
home-grown, laboratory variety; as long as the parameters are known, the theory will 
produce a prediction. It is this general property of theory that is important for laboratory 
experimental work. Figure 2 will help make the point more clearly. 
Theories and models can take many competing forms or be based on different prin­
ciples of behavior and still have the properties of the fundamental equation. Those cap­
tured by the box in Figure 2 are examples. Given some fixed "economic environment" 
of preferences , institution, and feasible sets , the outcomes predicted could be based on 
a large number of different cooperative game theoretic models or the prediction could 
be based on any of a large number of noncooperative models. Consider first the co­
operative model options. Cooperative game models can differ according to the choice 
of dominance relations and can differ depending upon the nature of the characteristic 
function. Differences in models can also reflect different selections from a large set of dif­
ferent solution concepts (core, bargaining sets ,  etc. ) . Even within the class of cooperative
game models the number of models that could be applied to the same environment is 
large. However, cooperative models do not exhaust the possibilities. The model applied 
to the same environment might be based on noncooperative theoretic principles. Non­
cooperative theories can differ according to hypotheses about the information structure 
generated by the institutional arrangement. The number of possible models is also ex­
panded by the choice of an equilibrium concept (Nash, perfect Nash, etc.) . Cooperative
games and non-cooperative games do not exhaust the possibilities. The model might be 
based on principles of nonstrategic behavior and yield outcomes like those predicted by 
the competitive model. The number of potential models is impressive. 
The lessons of Figure 2 are firstly, that models of economies found in the wild tend 
to have a similar structure and that structure is captured by the fundamental equation. 
Secondly, such models are general models involving basic principles intended to have 
applicability independent of time and location except to the extent to which time and 
location have an effect on the variables of the fundamental equation, (preferences, insti­
tutions, information, and feasible sets ). Third, we see that a staggeringly large number
of theories exist. One purpose of the laboratory is to reduce the number by determining 
which do not work in the simple cases. The purpose is also to improve the models by 
exploring how the model might be changed to make it work better in the simple cases. 
General models,  such as those applied to the very complicated economies found in the 
wild, must apply to simple special cases. Models that do not apply to the simple special 
cases are not general and thus cannot be viewed as such. The trick is to notice that 
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economies created in the laboratories might be very simple relative to those found in na­
ture but they are just as real. Real people motivated by real money make real decisions, 
real mistakes and suffer real frustrations and delights because of their real talents and 
real limitations. Simplicity should not be confused with reality. Since they are real the 
general principles and models that exist in the literature should be expected to apply 
with the same force to these laboratory economies as to those economics found in the 
field. The laboratories are simple but the simplicity is an advantage because it allows 
the reasons for a model's failure to be isolated and sometimes even measured. 
The process of learning is roundabout. The questions posed by experimentalists 
address the points of accuracy and the points of failure of general models and principles 
of economic behavior. Theories that predict relatively poorly in the laboratory are either 
rejected or refined. Models and principles that survive the laboratory can then be used 
to address questions about the field. Why something happened or what might happen 
in some naturally occurring economy are questions addressed by models that have been 
refined by laboratory testing. It is the understanding of the nature of those models, some 
of their points of accuracy and failures, that can be gleaned from laboratory studies. 
Presumably this understanding helps with field applications . The laboratory is not a 
source of direct simulation of what might happen in the field. The use of theory is an 
intervening stage. The learning process is roundabout. 
A recognition of this roundabout means of learning removed two intellectual con­
straints which together had made laboratory methods useless. The first was a belief that 
the only relevant economies to study are those in the wild. This belief suggested that 
the only effective way to create an experiment would be to mirror in every detail, to 
simulate, so to speak, some ongoing natural process. Early experimenters were guilty 
of yielding to this belief and described experiments as simulations of a market (Smith, 
1962) or attempted to include in their experiments much of the rich and complicating 
detail found in many markets (Friedman and Hoggatt, 1980) . As a result the experiments 
tended to be dismissed either because as simulations the experiments were incomplete 
or because as experiments the environments were so complicated that tests of models 
were unconvincing. In other words, the experiment would be dismissed either because 
it did not mirror some natural process, or because it did. Once models, as opposed to 
economies, became the focus of research the simplicity of an experiment and perhaps even 
the absence of features of more complicated economies became an asset. The experiment 
should be judged by the lessons it teaches about theory and not by its similarity with 
what nature might happened to have created. 
The second constraint to the development of laboratory experiments was a belief 
about the proper way to test a theory. Typically a theory is viewed as being of the
form "if x then y." Following this belief, the proper way to test a theory is to create a
circumstance in which all of the assumptions of the theory are satisfied, the x part of the 
statement, and then conduct the experiment to see if y is the result. If y is not observed 
then the theory is rejected as being false. The problem with this methodology is not 
that it is wrong. The problem is that the assumptions of economic theories are seldom 
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stated in operational terms and the theories themselves can be so vague that tests in 
the sense above are practically impossible. For example, a proposition frequently stated 
as an "assumption" of the competitive model is that each agent "believes" that his/her 
actions will have no effect on price. If the theory is stated in that form, then for practical 
purposes laboratory testing is impossible. In order to test the theory in that form, the 
experimenter must somehow know what exists in the minds of subjects. Since such data 
can never be known to the experimenter, the theory cannot be tested in the laboratory, 
in the field, or in any other way. The "if" part of the conditional cannot be known to be 
satisfied. 
Experimenters learned to sidestep this issue by posing tests as contests among com­
peting models. The question posed by the experimenter evolved from a single question 
of the form "is this theory true?" to include questions like "which of these models best 
predicts what is observed in the simple experimental economies?" ; or, to include a slight 
variant of that question "what are the circumstances under which the predictions of this 
theory /model improve or deteriorate?" .1 This new, broader set of questions is based upon 
the recognition that simple, special cases of economies are legitimate entities to study 
and that the predictive capacity of a theory or model might be unrelated to whether 
or not the assumptions are satisfied. 2 By considering a different set of questions than 
historically had been considered, experimentalists began to develop the art of posing 
questions that a laboratory experiment can answer. 
Step 2: Some Important Discoveries Were Made
During the very early years of experimentation, three very important discoveries were 
made. In some sense these establish a foundation for all subsequent work but they were 
not appreciated at the time. In fact, it is only recently, after many replications, and 
hundreds of experiments of different types, can we look back and recognize these early 
events as discoveries. 
Chamberlin ( 1948) made major progress toward studying the law of supply and de­
mand, although he really failed to recognize the nature and the importance of his discov­
ery. Hoggatt ( 1959), Sauermann and Selton ( 1959, 1960), Siegel and Fouraker ( 1960) all 
discovered the power of the Nash equilibrium and Siegal and Fouraker were the first to 
use laboratory methods to study the influence of institutions. Vernon Smith ( 1 962) dis­
covered the operation of the law of supply and demand in open outcry markets. Figure 1 
is simply one sort of replication of what Smith discovered. The decade following these 
early discoveries contains several important experiments but I think two very small, if not 
trivial, discoveries in the early 1 970s, both contained in the same paper (Plott and Smith, 
1 978),  provide one of the keys to unlocking the door to understanding what happened at 
Step 2. 
1A clear early statement of this change in perspective to deal with many competing models is in 
Fiorina and Plott (1978). 
2See Goodfellow and Plott (1990) for a discussion of this issue. When a sharp differentiation between 
assumptions and principles is absent in the theory, the classical concept of testing a theory does not 
work. 
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The first discovery was that a concept of efficiency can be applied to evaluate and 
measure the performance of an experimental market. The discovery was simply that 
a cost/benefit analysis could be applied directly to experimental markets. The area 
under the demand curve is the amount paid to subjects by the experimenter. The area 
under the marginal cost curve is what subjects pay to the experimenter. The consumers' 
surplus plus the producers' surplus is maximum total earnings that subjects can get from 
participation. The gains from trade in the laboratory market are the subject payment 
cost of the experiment to the experimenter. If all gains from trade are exhausted, then 
as a group, subjects have earned the maximum total possible from the experiment. The 
efficiency with which the market facilitates the acquiring of such gain would be 100% in 
case the maximum is attained. The efficiency of market operations can then be measured 
by the actual payments to subjects divided by the maximum possible. 
This simple technique has very important applications. It can be used to measure 
the efficiency with which different institutions can operate to solve the same problem. 
Within a fixed economic environment (preferences and feasible sets), the experimenter 
can conduct different experiments with different institutions and compare the efficiencies. 
Thus, the technique provides a way to compare and evaluate the performance of different 
institutional arrangements. It is especially important to notice that this comparative 
analysis can take place even though the experimenter may have no reasonable theory of 
why the institutions affect the markets as they do. Experiments can be useful even in 
the absence of theory. 
The second discovery was actually a rediscovery that institutions have an effect on 
market performance. This time, however, the institution and the effect were both clearly 
identified and the institution was not just any old institution. The institution was posted 
prices, similar to the rate posing process that have been used by the Department of 
Transportation and the Interstate Commerce Commission for years. Furthermore, the 
effect was not just any old effect. Posted prices cause prices to go up and efficiency to go 
down relative to what would be the case under an open-outcry system. Exactly why this 
occurs is still an open question li.lthough the best model developed so far is the mixed 
strategy solutions of a Bertrand game representation of the market. 
These two discoveries set the stage for the use of laboratory experimental methods in 
policy analysis. The efficiency measure and related concepts can be used to measure and 
identify the difference between competing modes of market organization. This compar­
ison can proceed even if no good theoretical representation of processes exists. That is, 
the empirical work can proceed in the absence of theory although the presence of theory 
certainly enhances its usefulness. Furthermore, since the posted price was an important 
variant of market regulatory machinery, the analysis could be focused directly on reg­
ulatory issues. Evaluation of the relative performance of market organizations in the 
laboratory provided a new source of insights about how such institutions might operate 
when implemented in the field. A laboratory-based policy analysis began to take form 
(Hong and Plott, 1982). 
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Step 3: Economic Theory Advanced
The substantial changes in theory that took place in the late 1970s and 1980s do not 
need to be reviewed here. Information became a key variable and, with this variable, 
scientific interest in noncooperative game theory, which, for practical purposes, was a 
dead subject prior to the late 1970s, began to be stimulated. 
The newly developed tools of analysis suggested the existence of very subtle relation­
ships among the actions taken by economic agents and the institutions in which they 
are operating. The implications of rationality of self and of others began to grow in 
importance. Efficiency began to expand from simple allocation efficiency to information 
efficiency and both began to depend critically upon the ability of agents to assimilate 
information from complex data and the knowledge that others could do the same. Slight 
changes in institutional form could have dramatic implications in terms of the predictions 
of the new game theoretic models. Critical features of models used in applications began 
to be so delicate that any testing in the field would be essentially hopeless. History does 
not often shape itself to suit the convenience of analysts who might like to test some 
of the very basic propositions about human actions and market behaviors that modern 
economic theory suggests might exist. 
The matrix game represented in Figure 3 will provide some intuition about the issues 
for those who are not versed in game theory. In that game the outcome in the lower right 
hand corner is a Nash equilibrium. If row player chooses B and column player chooses C, 
neither has an incentive to change given the choice of the other. How might the system 
get there? Row player can see that column player will not choose B because for column 
player, B is dominated by both columns A and C. Furthermore, row player understands 
that column player understands that if column B is not played, then for row player row 
A is dominated by row B. So, row player is not likely to play A. It follows that column 
will play C. By such repeated arguments that apply not only rationality of self but also 
rationality of others, and so forth, a presumption exists that the lower right hand corner 
will be the outcome. 
This role of rationality and public knowledge of rationality is an important feature 
of models and we will return to this feature of theory later. For now, it is sufficient to 
note that the choice of concepts of equilibrium used in a model can have an impact on 
predictions about the ultimate consequences of institutions on allocations. The example 
is really only illustrative of the issue. Modern theory has produced dozens of interest­
ing new concepts of equilibrium and/or solution concepts, especially in cases in which 
the economic situation involves asymmetric information. Such theory also suggests the 
existence of what otherwise might be thought of as strange phenomena such as rational 
expectations equilibria. 
Even though the solution concepts might have dramatically different consequences for 
institutional behavior, the data needed to distinguish between them, to determine which 
of them is the most accurate, can only be revealed at certain critical points of the decision 
making process. If the data can only come from the field, and from repeated observations 
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of special circumstances found there, then the appropriate tests will probably never be 
conducted. The only practical source of data that can be obtained within an appropriate 
time frame and serve as a guide for many of the newly developed theories is the laboratory. 
Step 4: Laboratory Data Suggests that Theory is on the Right Track
It is one thing to say that the laboratory can be used as a source of data. It is very 
much another thing to say that something exists by way of theory that is worth the effort 
needed for a test. Experiments conducted in the late 1970s provided strong suggestions 
that modern theories were not completely hopeless and, indeed, appeared to be on the 
right track. 
Many examples exist. The law of supply and demand was well established by the late 
1 970s. The importance of the CORE of game representation of committee processes had 
also been well established by the late 1970s. Rational expectations had received strong 
support. In addition, the work with nonhuman animals in the early 1 970s was extremely 
important because it leads directly to the hypothesis that a biological bases exists for 
preferences and optimizing behavior that is so fundamental to modern theory. 
Perhaps the easiest examples to explain are the experiments with sealed bid auctions. 
The theory of auctions is one of the most completely developed theories in the social 
sciences. The theory is well developed in the sense that the basic principles of game 
theory can be applied to create a model for which many of the definitions and assumptions 
can be made operational and implemented in an experimental environment. 
Consider an economic environment in which one unit of a good is sold by a sealed 
bid auction process. The values of each of n bidders are drawn independently from a 
probability density function f( v ) .  Having knowledge of his or her own value v and the 
knowledge that the value of others are drawn from the same p.d.f. ,  the individual must 
tender a sealed bid. The item is then sold to the highest bidder at his/her bid. 
The value of the object to each individual will, in general, be different. From the 
point of view of any single individual, the values of the other people are random with 
some known probability structure. Of course, the individual would like to purchase the 
object and obtain it at a low price. Specifically, if w is the wealth of the individual, and 
v is the value of the item to that individual, then the individual's utility given a winning 
bid at bid price bis u (w + v - b). The utility of the auction outcome if the individual 
fails to t ender the winning bid is simply u( w ). 
The problem faced by the individual who knows his/her own value v is to choose 
a bid. Since the bid depends upon the individual's value v, the implicit decision is the 
choice of a bid function b = b( v) indicating what the individual would do depending upon 
the circumstances. The individual knows that other individuals face the same task and 
will develop their own individual bid functions. 
The situation lends itself naturally to a game theoretic model. The theory is remark­
ably complex if f ( v) is not uniform and if individuals are not risk neutral. From an 
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individual's point of view, the problem is outlined in Figure 4. Each individual must 
choose a bid function, a "strategy" in game theoretic terms, from all of the bid functions 
that might be imagined ( the "strategy set") .  Each individual's payoff depends upon 
his/her own choice of strategy and the strategy choices of others. Under suitable con­
ditions on the probability distribution, which describes the distribution of values across 
agents and under suitable conditions on the individual attitudes toward risk, a Nash equi­
librium of the implied game exists. These equilibrium bid functions can be computed 
and compared to the actual bid functions of people participating in auction experiments. 
Figure 5 displays three actual decisions of an individual in an auction experiment. 
Three people were competing.3 In this environment the values are drawn from 0 to $10. 
The probability that an individual's value is between 0 and $5 is .8 and the probability 
that the value is $5 or more is .2. Values within a range are equally likely. The first of 
the three draws by the individual was $2.45 and the resulting bid was $2.20 as shown on 
the figure. This was a winning bid so the profit of this individual was $.25. The bids of 
the other two subjects were $1.24 and $.30. Of course, the amounts of money were real 
and the individual kept all profits. On the second draw the individual received a value of 
$1. 1 1  the bid was $1.00. The bids of the other two were $4.01  and $3.06 so the profit of 
this individual was zero. When the value drawn was $4.44 the individual bid was $3.47. 
As can be seen, the elements of a bidding function b( v} are beginning to appear in the 
figure. The question is whether or not the function is one predicted by theory. 
Figure 6 contains all of the bids made by this individual. It also contains two different 
solutions to the game theoretic representation of the auction process. The lowest, most 
inaccurate bid function is based upon the assumption that this individual and others are 
risk neutral. As can be seen,  the model predicts areas in which nonlinearites might occur 
but the risk neutral model is certainly inaccurate quantitatively. The bids it predicts are 
much lower than actual bids. 
The second bid function is based upon the assumption that bidders are risk averse 
(constant relative risk aversion) with a random risk aversion parameter.4 The simple 
risk aversion parameter is estimated from the linear portion of the bid function. As is 
obvious from the figure, the model begins to take the shape of the data. The accuracy 
of the model when applied to other individuals' data is similar to the one in the figure. 
The point of this example is not that game theory has established some sort of iron 
law of behavior. The point is much more modest. The data from auction experiments, 
market experiments, committee experiments, etc. all have a common thread. Principles 
of economics and game theory lead to models that capture much of the essence of behav­
ior. The data strongly suggest the existence of uniformities of behavior in complicated, 
competitive environments and that theory is on the right track. The data suggest that 
modern theorizing has been worth the effort. Theory appears to provide windows through 
3Space prevents a detailed description of the experimental procedures and environments. For a 
detailed discussion, see Cox, Roberson and Smith, 1982. 
4See Cox, Smith and Walker for the details of such a model. 
10  
which fundamental uniformities of human behavior can be viewed. Even though experi­
mental work suggests that more theory is needed, the message that began to emerge from 
research in the late 1 970s had clear and substantial positive elements. That message is 
an example of Step 4. 
Step 5: Paradoxes Begin to Appear 
vVhen theory appears to be going in the right direction, the natural reaction of the 
scientist is to explore those directions as far as possible. Some of the more important 
directions suggested by modern theory are those provided by principles of game theory. 
The questions posed are whether or not the theory continues to be accurate when some of 
its more subtle implications are tested. A second and independent set of research direc­
tions is indicated by the procedures and institutions previously explored experimentally. 
The question posed is whether or not the stylized facts that emerged from the study of 
very simple environments continue to be observed as the institutions change and take on 
increasingly complex properties. Such experiments are checks on the robustness of previ­
ous results. Failures to obtain positive results in either direction are called "paradoxes" 
(as opposed to "rejected theories"). 
Paradoxes began to appear in many contexts. Three of the most fascinating will 
be considered here. They are, in turn, the winner's curse, the behavior in centipede 
experiments, and the existence of bubbles in asset markets. These three are interesting 
because the theory that served well to explain behavior in closely related experiments 
predicts that the phenomena observed in these experiments simply cannot exist. The 
very existence of the phenomena suggests the need for a reworking of theory at a very 
fundamental level. 
Experiments in which the winner's curse is observed involve only a seemingly, slight 
alteration in the procedures of the first price auction experiments discussed in the section 
above. The structure is changed from a private value auction to a common value auction 
in which the value of the object sold is the same for all bidders. The value of the object 
is randomly determined. Each agent is then given a clue to the true value. The clue is 
drawn independently from a probability distribution that depends upon the true value. 
The agent must then determine a bid based upon the clue. 
The winner's curse phenomena, first observed experimentally by Kagel and Levine 
( 1986)  is that the winning bid is almost always above the true value of the item. That is, 
the auction winner almost always loses money. The existence of the phenomena creates 
a paradox because models constructed from the basic principles of game theory predict 
that the phenomena cannot exist. 
Figure 7 can help with an explanation of the experimental environment. In this 
experiment , the value of the item v was drawn uniformly from 0 to $500. Seven bidders 
tendered bids. The clue for each agent was drawn uniformly from v ± $30 where v was 
the actual value of the item. If the winning bid is above v, then the winner loses money. 
If Si is the clue received by individual i, the optimal bidding rule for risk neutral agents 
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is b(si) =Si - $30 . In the example in the Figure, v is 180 and s = 165. The individual 
sees only 165 and knows only that vc[135, 195]. 
Figure 8 contains some of the actual data from the point of view of one agent in 
an experiment conducted by Lind and Plott ( 1991 ) . The Lind and Plott experiment,
conducted in the spirit of distrust, was a replication of the Kagel and Levine experiment. 
The signal seen by the individual is called "our sample." The bid tendered by the 
individual is called "our bid." As can be seen, this individual never followed the optimal 
bidding rule. The bids of this agent and the bids of others were always too high. The 
table shows that this agent saw losses occurring repeatedly to other agents in auction 
after auction and in period 4 experienced a loss himself. 
The overbidding that contributes to the winner's curse phenomena is exhibited by 
almost all agents. It continues over repeated trials. When agents who exhibit Nash-type 
behavior in private value auctions are placed in common value auctions, the winner's 
curse immediately appears. 
How can individuals who otherwise appear so rational produce such "non-rational" 
behavior? That is the paradox. The resolution posed by Kagel and Levine was that 
individuals failed to properly compute an order statistic. If all individuals are rational, 
then bids increase with the value of the clue. This means that the individual with the 
largest clue (which will almost certainly be above the value of the item) will win the
auction. The bid must then be properly discounted from the clue to reflect the fact that 
if the bid wins, then the clue was the most extreme above the value of the object. The 
proposed resolution of the paradox is that individuals may be rational but they fail to 
anticipate and incorporate the rationality of others into their decisions. They fail to 
realize that they will win the auction only when they have the highest signal. 
The second example is called the centipede game. In this process, two individuals 
participate in a finite sequence of moves that involve options of the following sort. The 
first person has an option of two amounts of money {x, y} with the property that x > 2y. 
If the chooser takes one of the amounts of money, the process ends with the choosing 
agent keeping the amount taken and the other agent receiving the other amount. If the 
first agent passes, then both amounts of money are doubled and the second player has 
the choice between {2x, 2y} or passing back to player one and allowing both amounts 
to  double. If players continue to pass, then at the kth decision the amounts will be 
{2kx, 2ky }. The process is known (publicly) to terminate at decision T at which point
the choosing agent chooses between {2T x, 2T y} and does not have an option to pass.
A natural game theoretic representation of the process is a game with perfect infor­
mation. The Nash equilibrium of such a game is for the first chooser to take the largest 
amount and terminate the game immediately. This result follows by backward induction 
from the terminal period, the perfect information, and the "rationality" of both players. 
The T-1 player should recognize that he or she will get the smaller amount if "pass" is 
chosen and, therefore, would choose to take the larger amount at T-1 and stop the game. 
However, the T-2 player anticipates that and so would terminate at T - 2. The logic 
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works its way back to t = 0 .  Interest in the game stems directly from the lack of intuitive 
appeal of the (only) Nash equilibrium. 
Experiments with the centipede game conducted by McKelvey and Palfrey ( 1990) 
started with the amounts {$.40, $. 10} and continued for a maximum of seven decisions 
ending with a maximum of {$25.60, $6.40}. Contrary to the perfect information game ·
theoretic model, agents do not take the cash and terminate the game on the first move. 
However, as agents have more experience, the terminations occur earlier. The table 
contains the relevant statistics from the McKelvey and Palfrey study. The data are 
partitioned into two sets according to subject experience with the game. Each subject 
participated in 10 trials (each trial could involve up to seven decisions). At the first trial 
subjects had no previous experience. At the 10th trial subjects had played the game 9 
previous times with 9 different people. In the table the results of trials 1-5 are presented 
separately from trials 6-10 .  
First notice that the probability of termination at stage 1 is not 100% as predicted by 
theory. In trials 1-5 no game terminated at the first choice. In trials 6-10  only 2 of 136 
people, or 1 %, chose to terminate at the first move as theory predicts. However, as can 
be seen, the probability of having terminated by a given stage in trials 1-6 stochastically 
dominates the probability of having terminated in that same stage in trials 1-5. Even 
the rate of termination is higher at all stages except the 5th stage. 
Such data present an obvious puzzle. Are principles at work which cause behavior 
to converge with experience toward Nash play? The Nash play captures some of the 
behavior in the sense that terminations occur substantially prior to the final round. But 
it is certainly not exactly what happens. How can the model be modified to account for 
what is observed? As can be seen, the puzzles and paradoxes begin to emerge as both 
theory and experiments become more sophisticated. 
The final example is the behavior of asset markets. Early experiments with asset 
markets by Forsythe, Palfrey and Plott ( 1982)(1984) gave clear support for rational 
expectations. The assets studied had two-period lives and the dividends involved no ran­
dom component . The environment was complicated by Friedman, Harrison and Salman 
( 1 984) to include a three-period life and random dividends. The results did not differ 
substantially from those of Forsythe, Palfrey and Plott. Motivated by these early re­
sults, Smith, Suchanek and Williams ( 1 988) decided to explore assets with long lives and 
random dividends. Experimentation under generalizations of existing procedures and 
environments is a natural thing to do. 
The asset studied by Smith, Suchanek and Williams had a fifteen-period life. Each pe-
riod it paid a dividend which was drawn with equal probabilities from the set {$60, $.28, $.08, 0}. 
Thus the expected dividend each period was $.24. At period 1 the expected dividend 
stream was $.24x15 = $3.60 and in period 2 the expected value is $.24 less. The mid-
dle curve in Figure 9 shows the "fundamental value" of the asset. If the asset paid the 
maximum possible dividend ($.60) throughout life (a very unlikely event) ,  then the value 
would be the top curve in the figure. 
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The dots in the figure are contracts executed through a computerized market. As 
can be seen, the assets begin trading at prices slightly below the expected value and 
in period 2 prices are near the expected value. However, by period 3 the assets are 
trading above expected value. Prices increase slowly from period to period even though 
the expected value is falling. By period 10  the assets are trading at prices equal to the 
maximum possible yield and by period 1 1  prices are above the maximum possible yield. 
Such high prices cannot be due to optimism about fundamental values. In period 14 a 
violent market crash occurs as prices fall to levels near the expected value. The time 
series clearly demonstrates the properties of a bubble and a market crash. 
A puzzle emerges. How can markets populated with rational agents have such prop­
erties? How can the models be changed to account for this phenomena? 
The experimental literature and the theoretical literature contain some hints about 
possible solutions to all three paradoxes, the winner's curse, the centipede and asset 
market bubbles. Rationality of agents might not be public information. Each agent 
might be rational but might also be unsure about the rationality of others. Perhaps 
the rationality of others is only learned by experience. Recall, in the centipede game, 
experience seemed to foster more Nash-like behavior. People seemed to learn that other 
people were prepared to defect. Similarly, the "bigger fool" beliefs could account for 
asset market bubbles. If an agent believes that he or she can sell the asset to someone 
else for the same price next period, then the dividend is obtained free. In the bubble 
experiments experience in asset markets makes the bubble "pop" sooner and after three 
or four such market experiences, the bubbles almost completely disappear. The fact 
that "bigger fools" do not exist may become public information with experience in the 
market. Even the early experiments by Forsythe, Palfrey and Plott exhibited properties 
that the authors called the "swing back hypothesis" - repeated experiences with final­
period behavior become incorporated in the earlier decisions as agents deal repeatedly 
over the lifetimes of assets. 
The suggested solution to the paradoxes is only speculation. However, if it is taken 
seriously it motivates a host of related questions. Do special market instruments exist 
(futures markets, options markets) that make public the rationality of individuals? If
"irrationality" exists, exactly how might it be integrated into the models? The ideas 
suggested by Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson ( 1982) provide a start. The model 
developed by McKelvey and Palfrey to explain the centipede game depends heavily on 
such ideas. However, few people believe that theory should end with the "gang of four" 
paper and I should emphasize again that this proposed solution is the only idea that 
exists. 
Step 6: Say's Law of Experimental Methods Takes Over
The famous law of J. B. Say, that supply creates its own demand, seems applicable 
to the case of experimental research. The application of experimental methods generates 
research questions that can only be answered by a more intense use of experimental meth­
ods. The supply of experimental research creates a demand for even more experimental 
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research. When Say's law of experimental methods takes over, the stage is set for an ever 
increasing tendency to use experiments. The stage becomes set for economics to slowly 
but surely become a laboratory experimental science. 
The sections above illustrate how it has happened in one case. Experiments suggest 
that modern theory is on the right track (Step 4). Models based on principles of game 
theory clearly receive much support in the experimental literature. When applied to 
simple cases, such models are more accurate than any theory found in any branch of any 
other science that might be applied to those cases. However, paradoxes exist (Step 5 ) .  
Phenomena exist that are clearly beyond the explanatory capacities of modern models. 
But the existence of such phenomena does not mean that theory should stop. Versions of 
the theory that might readily account for the phenomena by removing the central role of 
publicness of rationality already exist in the literature. Such theories are not particularly 
well developed and require special theories of information and learning. Considerably 
more experimental work will be necessary to determine if changes in the rationality 
postulates are the correct way to push theory and to narrow the options from the many 
different forms that such theory might take. This need for new experiments brings us to 
Step 6. Experimental research creates a demand for more experimental research. 
I'm reminded of the joke about the man who was talking with his physician after 
having taken a series of tests the week before. The physician first tells the man the good 
news: "The test report said that you would die in twenty-four hours" . Shocked and 
outraged, the man yells "How can you say that? How can that be good news?" "What 
could possibly be the bad news?" The physician looks at him sadly. "The bad news is," 
says the physician, "we got the test results yesterday. " 
To those who are not enthusiastic about the use of laboratory experimental methods, 
the prohibitionists so to speak, the good news is that the profession has tasted the devil's 
brew, the use of experimental methods, and likes it. "If that is the good news, what on 
earth could be the bad news?" , the prohibitionists might ask. The bad news is that all 
six of the seductive steps to sin and intoxication have occurred in almost every 
subfield of economics. Those who have not been touched are being tempted. Say's law 
of experimental methods seems to be operating everywhere. The impact might not be 
noticeable yet but the process is operating. 
Let me be clear about my answer to the question posed by the title of this paper. I do 
not believe that experimental methods will replace field research. Economies found in the 
wild can only be understood by studying them in the wild. Field research is absolutely 
critical to such an understanding. �owever, the theories and models used in field research 
necessarily incorporate many judgments about assumptions, parameters and behavioral 
principles. The simple cases that can be studied in the laboratory can provide the data 
against which the importance of such judgments can be assessed. Economics is one of 
the few sciences that is fortunate to have both the field and the laboratory with which to 
work. The thesis of this paper is that the laboratory methodology, which has historically 
been absent , will grow and become an important partner in a joint effort to isolate the 
principles which govern economic behavior. 
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TABLE 
DECISIONS IN CENTIPEDE GAME 
$ Amounts .40 .80 1.60 3.20 6.40 12.80 25.60 
of Money . 1 0  .20 .40 .80 1 .60 3.20 6.40 
Choosing 
Individual 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 
Trials 1-5 
#of People 
Choosing 145 145 137 1 1 2  64 16 4 
Number of 
Terminations 0 8 25 48 48 12  
Probability of 
Termination 0 .06 . 18 .43 . 75 .75 
Trials 6-10 
#of People 
Choosing 136 134 124 93 33 10 1 
# of Terminations 2 1 0  31  60 23 9 
Probability of 
Termination .01  .07 .25 . 65 .70 .90 
Source: Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas Palfrey ( 1990) 
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SEALED BID AUCTION: PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUAL CHOICE 
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